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THE APHORISMS

OF THE

MÍMÁNSÁ PHILOSOPHY

BY

JAIMINI.

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WITH

EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

Printed for the use of the Benares College,
by order of Govt., N. W. P.

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ALLAHABAD:
PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS.
Rev. Jos. Warren, *Supt.*
1851.

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PREFACE.

—ooOoo—

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
31*st July*, 1851.

THE MÍMÁNSÁ APHORISMS.

INTRODUCTION.

a. SALUTATION to the feet of the venerable preceptor !*

b. Veneration unceasingly be to *Jaimini*, who removes the defect of vision of the simple by the collyrium-needle of his Institutes which put an end to doubt as to the sense of scripture.†

c. Now a doubt being started as to whether or not *Jaimini* ought to have undertaken this work, which consists of twelve lectures,—and the *primâ facie* solution of the doubt being as follows—viz.—such a work of disquisition ought *not* to be undertaken, because a work of disquisition is of no use when Heaven *(swarga)* is obtained by the mere taking of the letters [of the *Veda* without regard to its sense], Heaven alone being [in this case] to be supposed the fruit, as it is in the case of the sacrifice called *viśwajit* [—mentioned in the 4th canto of the *Raghuvanśa*—], it being to be expected that there is *some* fruit attached

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* श्री गुरुचरणेभ्यो नमः ॥

† वेदार्थसंशयच्छेत्तुशास्त्राञ्जनशलाकया। मूढचक्षुर्मदच्छेत्रे नमो जैमिनये मुनिश्रम् ॥

to the perusal enjoined in the direction 'The Veda is to be perused' [—and Heaven being most probably the fruit when no other fruit is specified;—well, this *primâ facie* solution of the doubt having presented itself,] he declares the established tenet* [in regard to the point, as follows].

BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

SECTION I.

Of Duty.

अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

The subject proposed.

Aph. 1.—Next, therefore, [O student that hast attained thus far] a desire to know Duty *(dharmma)* [is to be entertained by thee].

a. 'Next':—i. e. after perusing the scriptures whilst residing with the family of a preceptor.†

b. 'Therefore':—i. e. because the fruit of the perusal of the scripture is the knowledge of the sense [of its several passages,

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* अथ द्वादशाध्यायात्मकं शास्त्रमारभ्यणीयं नवेति संशये। स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति विहिताध्ययनस्य फलाकाङ्क्षायां विश्वजिन्न्यायेन स्वर्ग एव फलं कल्प्यं। तथाचाक्षरग्रहणमात्रेण स्वर्गसिद्धौ विचारशास्त्रस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् विचारशास्त्रं नारभ्यणीयमिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† अथेति। अथ गुरुकुलवासपूर्वकवेदाध्ययनानन्तरम् ॥

without comprehensive apprehension of the import of its teachings—see Lecture on the Vedánta §6]; therefore, in respect of Duty, the definition of which will be stated [in *Aph.* 2.], "a desire to know"—i. e. an investigation originating in a desire of knowledge—is to be made;— such is the remainder* [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism].

c. The state of the case is this, that assuredly the work of disquisition *ought* to be undertaken, because such a work of disquisition is just subserved by [or has a foundation laid for it in] that knowledge of the sense [of the several passages of scripture, that may be attained by a perusal thereof], and because it is fit that what is effected by a perusal thereof should be a correct understanding of the sense thereof [—instead of *Heaven's* being attained thereby, as supposed by the speculater in Intro. *c.*] seeing that it is improper to imagine an *unseen* reward [of this or that action] when a *visible* reward is possible;† [—and the understanding of the sense of scripture is a manifest reward of its perusal, whilst the attainment of Heaven by the perusal of scripture is what no one can declare that he has ever found manifested by the senses].

d. As the question will occur—"*What* is the *Duty* spoken of, in the expression 'a desire to know Duty', in the preceding

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* अतः। यतो ऽध्ययनस्य फलमर्थज्ञानं। अतो धर्मस्य वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणस्य जिज्ञासा। ज्ञानेच्छासाध्यो विचारः। कर्त्तव्येति शेषः॥

† अयमभावः। सम्भवति दृष्टफले अदृष्टफलकल्पनमनुचितमित्यध्ययनेन तदर्थनिश्चयसम्पादनस्योचित्वादर्थज्ञानस्य विचारशास्त्राधीनत्वादिदं विचारशास्त्रमवश्यमारम्भणीयमिति॥

aphorism?"—in order to acquaint us with the nature of Duty, he mentions its characteristic mark as follows.*

चोदनालक्षणो ऽर्थो धर्मः ॥ २ ॥

How Duty is to be recognised.

Aph. 2.—A matter that is a Duty is recognised by the instigatory character [of the passage of scripture in which it is mentioned].

a. 'Instigatory character' [of the passage]:—this means [that the criterion of Duty is] an expression that moves [or instigates] one† [to do so and so].

b. 'Is recognised'—i. e. is known thereby;—as fire is recognised by smoke, so that the smoke is the mark whereby fire [though unseen] is known [to be present where the smoke takes its rise]; in like manner an instigatory form of expression is the mark by which we recognise Duty. So Duty is that, the criterion, or the instrument [in the determination], of which, is an instigatory form of expression.‡

What essentially constitutes Duty.

c. And what constitutes any thing such a matter [i. e. a matter that is fit to be urged in

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* पूर्वसूत्रे धर्मजिज्ञासेत्यत्र को धर्म इति जिज्ञासायां धर्मस्वरूपज्ञानाय लक्षणमाह ॥

† चोदनेति प्रवर्त्तकशब्दनाम ॥

‡ लक्ष्यते ज्ञायते अनेनेति लक्षणं। यथा धूमेनवह्निर्लक्ष्यते इति वह्निज्ञाने लक्षणंधूमः। तद्वत् धर्मज्ञाने लक्षणं चोदना। इत्यञ्च चोदनैव लक्षणं करणं यस्य ॥

scripture as a Duty] is the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure* [—i. e. its being calculated to produce more pleasure than pain†].

d. And by this [mention, *Aph.* 2., of the mark whereby Duty is to be recognised], it is moreover suggested that a Duty is not to be apprehended by the senses or by any thing else besides the instigatory character‡ [of a passage in scripture].

e. But now [some one may ask], "Since, according to [the lexicon called] the *Medini Kośa*, 'The word *dharmma* should be masculine when it means merit, but when it means sacrifices, &c., it is held to be neuter,' how is the word *dharmma* masculine in the aphorism where it means the *Agnihotra* sacrifice and others [which are recognised as matters of Duty by the instigating promises attached to their performance] ?"—if you ask this,—then take [and be content with] as the reason thereof the fact that he [JAIMINI] is a great sanctified sage§ [—and therefore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases. Conf. the Vaiśeshika Aphorisms No. 7. *b*].

f. In the foregoing aphorism [§2.] it was intimated that the cause of [our correctly recognising] a Duty was simply an insti-

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* अर्थत्वञ्च सुखाधिकदुःखाजनकत्वम् ॥

† This definition of *dharmma* may be compared with the Benthamite definition of the Useful.

‡ एतेन चोदनातिरिक्तेन्द्रियादिगम्यत्वं धर्मस्य नेत्यपि सूचितम् ॥

§ ननु। अदृष्टे पुंसि धर्मः स्यात् क्लीबे यागादिके मत इति मेदिनीकोशात्। अग्निहोत्रादिवाचकधर्मशब्दस्य सूत्रे पुंस्त्वं कथमिति चेदार्षत्वमेव बीजमिति गृहाण ॥

gation [in the shape of a passage of scripture holding out a reward for its performance], but not any other evidence such as that of the senses, &c.* Since it is impossibe that the doubt, as to whether other evidences *do* enter into the case or not, should be removed without examination, he proposes the examination thereof* [as follows]...

तस्य निमित्तपरीष्टिः ॥ ३ ॥

The definition of Duty discussed.

Aph. 3.—An examination of the cause of [our recognising] it [—viz. Duty,— is to be made.]

a. 'Of it',—i. e. of a knowledge of the truth—the object [in respect of which that knowledge is wanted] being Duty. 'The cause',—i. e. the means. 'An examination' thereof,—i. e. a disquisition, a discussion, through decisive confutations [of the opposite opinion—see the Nyáya Aphorisms No. 39—] preceded by arguments [in support of the position laid down:—such an examination] is to be made:—such is the remainder† [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism].

b. [In the following aphorism] he explains the assertion that he made* [in Aph. 2].

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* धर्मे चोदनैव निमित्तं नतु प्रत्यक्षादीतरप्रमाणानीति पूर्वसूत्रेण ज्ञापितं। इतरप्रमाणानि तत्र प्रसरन्ति नवेति संशयस्य परीक्षामन्तरा निष्टंत्यसम्भवात् तत्परीक्षां प्रतिजानीते॥

† तस्येति। तस्य धर्मविषयकतत्त्वज्ञानस्य। निमित्तं। करणं। तस्य परीष्टिः। परीक्षा। युक्तिपूर्वकसाधकतर्कैर्विचारः। कर्त्तव्येति शेषः॥

सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भात् ॥ ४ ॥

Duty not an object of sense-perception.

Aph. 4. When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something extant, that birth of knowledge [which then takes place] is Perception,—[and this Perception is] *not* the cause [of our recognising Duty—see § 3—] because [the organs of sense are adapted only to] the apprehension of what is [then and there] existent [—which an act of Duty is *not*.]

a. 'When rightly applied to something extant' &c. [That is to say]—when a man's organs of sense are 'rightly applied to', or brought into contact with, 'something extant', i. e. some object [then and there] existing, what 'birth of knowledge', or of intellection, takes place, is [what we call] Perception :—and such Perception is '*not* the cause', i. e. not the producer, of a knowledge of Duty :—that is to say—the organs of sense, which are the means of arriving at the truths of perception, do *not* [of themselves] enable us to arrive at the truth in respect of Duty.†

b. Of this [—viz. that the senses are not the means of our discerning Duty—] he mentions the reason [—when he says—in § 4—] 'because the apprehension of what is existent'; that is to

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* प्रतिज्ञातमेवार्थं विशदयति ॥

† सत्सम्प्रयोग इति। पुरुषेन्द्रियाणां। सति। विद्यमाने विषये। सम्प्रयोगे। संयोगे सति। यत् बुद्धेः। ज्ञानस्य। जन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षं। ईदृशं प्रत्यक्षं धर्मज्ञान अनिमित्तं। नोत्पादकं। प्रत्यक्षप्रमासाधनीभूतानीन्द्रियाणि धर्मप्रमां न साधयन्तीति भावः ॥

say—because, by means of the organs of sense there is the apprehension of 'what is existent', i. e. of some thing [then and there] present;—and since *Duty* [—in the shape, suppose, of the performance of sacrifice—] is *not* present at the time of our knowing it [to be a Duty to perform the sacrifice,—] it is not adapted to the organs of sense.*

Not being an object of sense-perception, Duty is not to be recognised by inference from such perception.

c. From its being disproved that the *senses* are the cause thereof [i. e. of our discerning Duty—] it is to be understood as also disproved that Inference, or Analogy, or Conjecture [see Wilson's *Sánkhya Káriká* p. 21.—] which owe their birth thereto—having their root in Perception—can be the cause thereof. Therefore it is a settled point that the characteristic of Duty [—or that whereby we are to recognise it—as declared in *Aph.* 2.—] is the instigation† [of the passage in scripture where some act is mentioned as being calculated to lead to such and such consequences].

The doubt whether the evidence in favour of a Duty may not be fallacious as is that of the senses.

d. But then, an objector may urge,] —"after words and meanings have presented themselves, since the connection between the two is one devised by *man*—consisting, as it does, of the conventions which man has devised,—therefore, as sense knowledge wanders away from truth in respect of mother o'

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* तत्र हेतुमाह। विद्यमानोपलम्भात्। विद्यमानस्य। वर्त्तमानस्यैव वस्तुनः। इन्द्रियैरुपलम्भात्। धर्मस्यच ज्ञानकाले असत्त्वेन इन्द्रियायोग्यादिति भावः॥

† इन्द्रियाणान्तन्निमित्तत्वनिरसनेन तज्जन्यप्रत्यक्षमूलकव्याप्तिज्ञानसाद्दश्यार्थापत्तीनां तन्निमित्तत्वं निरस्तमवगन्तव्यं। अतश्चोदनामात्रगम्यत्वं धर्मलक्षणमिति सिद्धम्॥

pearl or the like [when it mistakes them for silver or the like], so since language, as it is dependent on man inasmuch as it has reference to the knowledge of a connection which was devised by man, is liable to part company with veracity in matters of declaration, the *instigatory nature* [of a passage which, being in words, is liable to be misunderstood,] cannot be the instrument of correct knowledge in respect of Duty":—well, this *primâ facie* view of the matter having presented itself, he declares the established doctrine as follows.*

औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

Reply—that this doubt does not affect the evidence of Scripture.

Aph. 5.—But the natural connection of a word with its sense is [the instrument of] the knowledge thereof, [i. e. of Duty], and the intimation [of Scripture which is] unerring though given in respect of something imperceptible. This [according to our opinion as well as that] of BÁDARÁYAṆA [the author of the Vedánta Aphorisms] is the evidence [by means of which we recognise Duty], for it has no respect [to any other evidence—such as that of sense].

a. 'Of a word,'—i. e. of an expression that is a constituent

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* शब्दार्थयोरुत्पत्त्यनन्तरं पुरुषेण कल्पितसङ्केतात्मकसम्बन्धस्य कल्पितत्वात्पुरुषकल्पितसम्बन्धज्ञानापेक्षत्वाच्छब्दस्य यथा प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं शुक्तिकादौ सत्यत्वं व्यभिचरति तथा पुरुषाधीनत्वेन शाब्देऽपि सत्यत्वव्यभिचारसम्भवान्न धर्मे चोदना प्रमानमिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

part of the everlasting Veda;—such as—"He that desireth Paradise should solemnise the *Agnihotra* sacrifice," &c.*

b. 'With its sense'—i. e. with the meaning which is to be conveyed by this or that† [word].

c. 'Connection'—in the shape of *power*‡ [or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning].

d. 'Natural'—i. e. inherent,—in short, *eternal*.§

e. Thence [i. e. from the eternal connection of a word with its sense] is the knowledge 'thereof'—i. e. of Duty. Here [i. e. in the word *jnána*] the affix *lyuṭ* conveys the force of the 'instrument',—so that the word signifies the *instrument* of knowledge or of right understanding.‖

An objection, founded on the impossibility of verification in the case overruled.

f. But then [some one may ask]—"since it is notorious in the world that, after hearing the expression 'It [—e. g. a mountain—] is fiery',—having *seen*, with the organ of sense, the fire [asserted to be, e. g., in the mountain], one *then* admits [—what one was not prepared to admit before subjecting the matter, on some occasion or other, to the test of the senses]—that matter of testimony *is* [or *may* be] matter of right knowledge

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* शब्दस्य। नित्यवेदघटकपदस्य। अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्यादेः॥

† अर्थेन। तत्तत्प्रतिपाद्यार्थेन॥

‡ सम्बन्धः। शक्तिरूपः॥

§ औत्पत्तिकः। स्वाभाविकः। नित्य इति यावत्॥

‖ अतस्तस्य। धर्मस्य। ज्ञानं। अत्र करणे ल्युट्। इष्टेर्थयार्थज्ञानस्य करणम्॥

[—or, in other words, that Testimony may be relied on, seeing that we have found it corroborated by the evidence of the senses—] ; since [we say] what is conveyed by *Words* [or Testimony] has need of *other* evidence, such as the senses, how can it be *this* to which we owe our right knowledge of Duty ?"—It is with an eye to this [anticipated objection] that he says, [in the Aphorism, that the testimony is here the evidence] 'in respect of something *imperceptible*', meaning thereby [that Duty is] something not to be apprehended by means of the senses or any other evidence* [apart from that specified in §2].

g. 'Intimation'—i. e. declaration of a fact.†

h. 'Unerring'—i. e. which is not seen to diverge therefrom‡ [i. e. from the fact].

i. 'For it has no respect'—i. e. because it has no reference to sense-perception, &c.§

j. 'This'—i. e. a sentence consisting of an injunction—is the evidence [on which rests our knowledge] of Duty ;—such is the consentaneous opinion of BÁDARÁYAṆA.‖ The drift [of what we

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* ननु वह्निमानिति शब्दश्रवणानन्तरं प्रत्यक्षेण वह्निं दृष्ट्वा शब्दे प्रमात्वं गृह्णातीति लोके प्रसिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षादीतरप्रमाणसापेक्षत्वाच्छब्दस्य स कथं धर्मे प्रमाणमत आह अनुपलब्ध्रति। अनुपलब्धे। प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैरज्ञाते ऽर्थे॥

† उपदेशः। अर्थप्रतिपादनम्॥

‡ अव्यतिरेकः। अव्यभिचारी दृश्यते अतः॥

§ अनपेक्षत्वात्। प्रत्यक्षाद्यनपेक्षत्वात्॥

‖ The mention of the name of BÁDARÁYAṆA (or VYÁSA) in the Aphorism goes to prove that JAIMINI'S work, the *púrvva-mímánsá*, was not antecedent in time to VYÁSA the author of the *uttara-mímánsá*. Mr. Colebrooke's rendering of the terms *púrvva* and *uttara* by 'prior' and 'later' (—see Essays. vol. 1. pp. 227 and 295—) would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that

have been arguing] is this. The sentence "The mountain is fiery", when employed by a man who is defective [in some of his organs of sense], wanders away from the fact [—for the mountain may *seem* to such a one to be fiery when it really is not—]; therefore we require to make use of our senses to ascertain whether credence is due [to the testimony of fallible man]:—but the injunction "He that desireth Paradise should solemnise the *Agnihotra* sacrifice" never at any time past present or future is liable thus to wander from the truth; therefore is it, independently of any thing else, the clear evidence of a duty.*

SECTION II.

On the Eternity of Sound.

The validity of Scripture implies the eternity of Sound.

k. It was stated in the foregoing Aphorism [No. 5] that the connection between a word and its sense is *eternal* [—see §5 *d.*]; and since this is dependent on the eternity of *Sound* [—seeing that if Sound were not eternal, then words formed of sound could not

JAIMINI'S system was the earlier in point of *time*. He says, (at p. 376, vol. IV. of his History of Philosophy,—Morrison's version—) that "according to Colebrooke, the adherents of this school may be divided into the earlier and the later",—and. then he goes on to speak of "the older and genuine Vedánta":—but in fact the terms 'prior' and 'later' refer to the divisions of the *Veda* which JAIMINI and VYÁSA respectively expound, the latter confining himself to the *Upanishads*, or theological sections, which stand last in *order*.

* तत्। विधिघटितवाक्यं। धर्मे प्रमाणं बादरायणाचार्यस्य सम्मतं। अयमाशयः। पर्वतो वह्निमानिति दोषवत्पुरुषप्रयुक्तं वाक्यं अर्थं व्यभिचरति। अतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चये प्रत्यक्षादिकमपेक्षते। तथा ऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति वाक्यं कालत्रये ऽप्यर्थं न व्यभिचरति। अत इतरनिरपेक्षं धर्मे प्रमाणमिति॥

be eternal, nor consequently the relation of such to their significations—], he, seeking to demonstrate this, sets forth, in the first place, the primâ facie view of the question in the shape of the opinion of those who assert that Sound is *not* eternal.*

कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात् ॥ ६ ॥

First objection to the eternity of Sound, that it is a product.

Aph. 6.—Some say that it [viz. Sound] is a product, for in the case of it we *see* [what constitutes it such].

a. 'Some say that it is a product, &c' :—'Some'—i. e. the followers of the Nyáya—say that Sound is a 'product',—i. e. something *not* eternal; 'for we see'—i. e. we see an *effort* made; 'in the case of it'—i. e. in the case of Sound; and it is a rule without exception that that is *not* eternal which *effort* is concerned in [the existence of].†

.. *b.* Moreover [the Naiyáyikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason]‡.

अस्थानात् ॥ ७ ॥

Second objection, that it is transitory.

Aph. 7.—Because of its transitoriness.

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* पूर्वसूत्रे शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धो नित्य इत्युक्तं। तच्च शब्द नित्यत्वाधीनमिति तत्सिसाधयिषुरादौ शब्दानित्यत्ववादिमतं पूर्वपक्षमुपादर्यति ॥

† कर्मेति। एके। नैय्यायिकाः। कर्म अनित्यं शब्दं वदन्ति। तत्र। शब्दविषये। दर्शनात्। प्रयत्नदर्शनात्। यद्विषयः प्रयत्नः सो ऽनित्य इति व्याप्तेः।

‡ किञ्च ॥

a. 'Because of its transitoriness'—i. e. because it is not permanent;—or in other words, because, beyond a moment, it is no longer perceived.*

b. Moreover† [the Naiyáyikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason].

करोतिशब्दात् ॥ ८ ॥

Third objection, that Sound is stamped as factitious by the usage of language.

Aph. 8.—Because [we employ, when speaking of Sound,] the expression '*making.*'

a. That is to say—because we treat it as something not eternal, inasmuch as we talk of *making* a sound, just as we talk of making a *jar.*‡

b. And for the following reason also, he mentions, they hold it to be not eternal.§

Fourth objection, that the alleged eternity of Sound is incompatible with its undeniable multeity.

सत्त्वान्तरे योगपद्यात् ॥ ९ ॥

Aph. 9.—From its simultaneousness in another person.

a. [To complete the sentence] it is necessary to supply 'in another place', when we speak of 'another person':—so then, we observe 'simultaneousness', i. e. the fact of belonging to one and the same time,—'in another being'—i. e. in the perception of [Sound by] another living creature occupying a different place.‖

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* अस्थानादस्थिरत्वात्। क्षणादूर्ध्वमनुपलब्धेरिति भावः॥

† किञ्च ॥

‡ यथा घटं करोतीति तथा शब्दं करोतीत्यनित्यत्वव्यवहारात् ॥

§ इतोऽप्यनित्य इत्याह ॥

‖ सत्त्वान्तर इति। देशान्तर इत्यपि पूरणीयं। यथा।

b. The scope [of the objection] is this, viz., the *unity* of Sound will follow from the very same argument by which, for shortness, its eternity will be established [by the followers of the Mímánsá, —supposing the argument to be admitted]; and thus *one* [numerically single] thing would be simultaneously perceived by [and hence simultaneously in immediate contact —see Nyáya Aphorisms, No. 4—with the sense-organs of] those both near and far;—and this could not be if it were [numerically] one and eternal;—therefore [the Naiyáyikas conclude] Sound is not eternal and it is plural.*

c. And for the following reason too [according to the Naiyáyikas] it is so [—that Sound is not eternal—], so the author mentions it† :—

प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्च ॥ १० ॥

Fifth objection, that sounds are liable to grammatical inflection.

Aph. 10.—And [the Naiyáyikas infer that Sound is not eternal, from the observation] of the original and altered forms [of sounds].

a. What is meant is this,—because it holds universally that that is not eternal the previous condition of which undergoes a change; and in the example *dadhyatra* [i. e. 'milk—here']

देशान्तरे। अन्यदेशस्थसत्त्वान्तरे। प्राप्यान्तरप्रत्यक्षे। यौगपद्यमेककालिकत्वं दृष्टम्॥

* अयमाशयः। यथा लाघवान्नित्यत्वं तथा तेनैव हेतुना शब्द एकत्वमपि सेत्स्यति। इत्यञ्चैकस्य वस्तुनस्य निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टप्रत्यक्षं युगपद्भवेत्। इदमेकत्वे नित्यत्वे ऽनुपपन्नं। अतो ऽनित्यः शब्दो नानाचेति॥

† इतो ऽपि तथेत्याह॥

where the original form was *dadhi atra,* there is a change in the shape of the letter *y* in the room of the original letter *i*.*

Sixth objection, that Sound proves the greater when more are engaged in making it.

दृष्टिश्च कर्तृभूम्नाऽस्य ॥ ११ ॥

Aph. 11.—And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it.

a. For *this* reason too, it [viz. Sound] is not eternal, that 'an augmentation', i. e. an increase, 'of it', i. e. of Sound, is observed [to be caused], 'by a multitude of makers', i. e. by the numerousness of those who make it. On the other hand, if you assume that human effort is [not the *maker* but only] the *manifester* of Sound, [—as a lamp is not the maker of a jar but the manifester of it—making cognizable the jar which previously existed unperceived—then we reply, that,] what is *manifested* is not seen to be *made greater* even by a thousand manifesters, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps, [and Sound *is* made greater by a multitude], therefore [say the Naiyáyikas] the alternative supposition of 'manifestation' [instead of production] will not answer:—such is the import.†

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* दध्यत्रेत्यत्र दधि अत्रेति प्रकृतिस्थितौ प्रकृतिभूतेकारस्थाने यकाररूपो विकारो भवति। यस्याः प्रकृतेर्विकारस्यो ऽनित्य इति व्याप्तेरिति भावः॥

† कर्तृभूम्ना। कर्तृबाहुल्येन। अस्य। शब्दस्य। दृष्टिः। महत्त्वं दृश्यते अतो ऽप्यनित्यः। पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य शब्दव्यञ्जकत्वपक्षे व्यञ्जकसहस्रेणापि व्यंग्यस्य दृष्टिर्न दृश्यते। यथा दीपसहस्रेणापि घटस्य। अतो व्यञ्जकत्वपक्षो ऽयुक्त इति भावः॥

The refutation of these objections in undertaken.

b. The several objections thus alleged against the 'manifestation' view [of Sound's coming to be perceived], he proceeds to refute in their order.*

समन्तु तत्र दर्शनम् ॥ १२ ॥

How far both parties agree.

Aph. 12.—But alike [according to both opinions—that of these objectors and of ourselves] is the *perception* thereof—[both agreeing that *this* is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to Sound itself's being so.]

a. 'But alike &c.' There requires to be supplied [to complete the aphorism] 'for a moment' and 'according to both opinions.' According to both opinions,—i. e. according to the opinion that it is *produced* and the opinion that it is *manifested*,—'alike,' i. e. without dispute, 'the perception,' i. e. sensation of Sound, is for a moment, i. e. *only* for a moment.†

b. Though [so far as *this* point is concerned] they are alike, yet which of the views is the best? To this question the reply is that the '*manifestation*' view is the proper one; so he proceeds to say as follows.‡

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* एवं व्यङ्गकत्वपक्षे बहूनि दूषणान्युक्तानि क्रमेण परिहर्त्तुमुपक्रमते ॥

† समिति। क्षणमिति मतद्वय इतिच पूरणीयं। मतद्वये। उत्पद्यते व्यज्यत इति मतद्वये। क्षणं। क्षणमात्रं। दर्शनं। शब्दप्रत्यक्षं। समं। अविवादम् ॥

‡ समत्वे ऽपि कतमः पक्षो वरिष्ठ इति प्रश्ने व्यज्यत्वपक्षो युक्त इत्याह ॥

सतः परमदर्शनं विषयानागमात् ॥ १ ३ ॥

How Sound exists even when not manifested.

Aph. 13.—Of this [Sound] while it really exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived] arises from the non-arrival of the manifester at the object.

a. 'Of this while it really exists' &c. 'While it really exists,' —i. e. which is at all times extant [whether perceived or not];— 'at another time,' i. e. at a time before or after; 'the non-perception,' i. e. the absence of perception, [arises] from non-arrival of the efficient manifester at 'the object,' i. e. at the Sound.*

b. The import is as follows. Sound is eternal, [as we are constrained to admit] by force of the recognition that 'This is that same letter K' [—viz. the same Sound that I heard yesterday or fifty years ago—, and I recognise it as I might recognise a peak of the perennial Himálaya which I do not suppose to cease to exist when I turn away my eyes from it—], and in virtue of *the law of parsimony*† [one of the fundamental laws of philosophizing acknowledged by philosophers both of the East and of the West, and implying that we must never assume more causes of a given effect than are sufficient to account for it‡].

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* सत इति। सतः। सर्वदा विद्यमानस्य। परं। पूर्वोत्तरकाले। अदर्शनं। प्रत्यक्षाभावः। संस्कर्त्तुरभ्यञ्जकस्य विषयं शब्दं प्रत्यनागमात्।

† अयं भावः। स एवायं ककार इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात्। लाघवाच्च। शब्दो नित्यः॥

‡ In opposition to the Mímánsakas, the Naiyáyikas contend that the form of expression 'This is that same letter K.' is grounded merely on the fact that the things referred to are of the same *kind*,—just as is the case with the ex-

What prevents its being always perceived.

c. The conjunctions and disjunctions [—or undulations—] of the air issuing from the mouth [of him who speaks or shouts] remove the *still* air* which was the obstacle to the perception of Sound, and thence it becomes perceptible:—such is the reply to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 7] of its 'transitoriness.†'

d. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 8] that we use the expression '*making*' [in regard to Sound].‡

प्रयोगस्य परम् ॥ १४ ॥

When we say we 'make' a sound, we ought to mean that we 'employ' a sound.

Aph. 14.—This [expression '*making*'] means [merely] *employing.*

a. In regard to Sound, when we speak of '*making*,' the word 'making' means, or imports, '*employing*,' i. e. uttering.§

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pression 'He has taken the same medicine that I did.' See the *Siddhánta Muktávali* p. 103. Compare also the remarks of Whately on the ambiguity of the word 'Same,' quoted at p. 39 of our 'Introduction to the Inductive Philosophy.'

* Europeans hold that Sound is due to vibration. Jaimini admits that it is not perceived when there is *no* vibration; but he argues that the absence of vibration, or the stillness of the air, is what prevents us from perceiving the sound which never ceases to *exist*, whether perceived or not.

† मुखोद्गतवायुसंयोगविभागाः शब्दप्रत्यक्षप्रतिबन्धकीभूतस्तिमितवायुन्दूरीकुर्व्वन्ति। ततः प्रत्यक्षमिति अस्थानादित्यस्योत्तरम्॥

‡ करोतिशब्दादित्यस्योत्तरमाह॥

§ प्रतिशब्दं करोतीत्यत्र करोतिपदं प्रयोगस्य। उच्चारणस्य। परं। तात्पर्यकम्॥

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 9] that Sound is heard simultaneously by different individuals.*

आदित्यवद्योगपद्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

As one sun is seen by many men, so is one sound heard.

Aph. 15.—The simultaneousness is as in the case of the sun.

a. 'As in the case of the sun:'—that is to say,—as the Sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, Sound is a great object, not a minute one† [such as cannot come at once under the inspection of persons at any distance from one another.]

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 10] respecting the original and altered forms of sounds.‡

वर्णान्तरमविकारः ॥ १६ ॥

Letters are exchanged, not transmuted.

Aph. 16.—This [viz. the letter *y*—referred to in *Aph.* 10.—when it comes in the room of the letter *i*] is another letter, not a modification [of that whose place it takes].

a. 'Another letter' &c,. That is to say,—in the room of the letter *i* is another letter—another sound—a different sound in short. It is not a modification of the letter *i* as a mat is a modification of the straws [out of which it is formed]. If it *were* so, then, as the maker of a mat is under the necessity of providing himself with straw, the man that employs the letter *y* would be under the necessity of taking the letter *i*§ [to make the *y* out

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* सत्त्वान्तरे यौगपद्यादित्यस्योत्तरमाह ॥

† आदित्यवदिति। यथा एकः सूर्यो नानादेशस्थैर्युगपदीक्ष्यते तथा आदित्यवन्महान् शब्दो न सूक्ष्म इति भावः ॥

‡ प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्चेत्यस्योत्तरमाह ॥

§ वर्णान्तरमिति इकारस्थाने यकारः वर्णान्तरं। शब्दान्तरं

of;—which is not the case, for one can use the letter *y* without any reference to the letter *i*].

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 11] that there is an augmentation* [of the sound when the makers of it are numerous].

नादवृद्धिः परा ॥ १७ ॥

Increase of noise not increase of Sound.

Aph. 17.—It is the increase of *noise* [not of *sound*] that is [in that case] augmented.

a. 'It is of noise,' &c. It is an error to say [as in *Aph.* 11] that it is an increase of *sound* that is 'augmented'—i. e. rendered greater.†

b. 'Increase of noise.' From many beaters of drums, or pronouncers of articulate sounds, it is recognised [by the hearers] that 'There is a great sound.' In such a case it is impossible, according to the opinion of our opponents [the Naiyáyikas] to say that portions of Sound, being produced by each of the men [concerned in the making of the noise], produce a great bulk of Sound, like a bulk of cotton [formed out of portions of cotton aggregated], because Sound, according to these opponents, inasmuch as it is a *quality*, has *no* parts‡ [or portions].

अन्यशब्द इति यावत्। न इकारस्य विकारस्तृणानां कट इव। तथा सति. कटकर्त्रा नियमेन तृणसम्पादनवत् यकारं प्रयुञ्जन्नियमेनेकारमादद्यादिति भावः ॥

* वृद्धिश्चेत्यस्योत्तरमाह ॥

† नादेति। परा। अतिशयिता। शब्दवृद्धिरिति भ्रम-विषया ॥

‡ नादवृद्धिः। बहुभिर्भेरीध्वनिः वर्णात्मकशब्दमुच्चार-

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c. Therefore,—as there is no arriving [at an explanation otherwise],—when the conjunctions and disjunctions [occasioned by the vibration of the air] take place continually without intermission, arriving from all quarters at the entrance to the hollow of the ear, it [the Sound] *seems* to be great, and to be made up of parts. What is meant [in *Aph.* 17] by 'noise' is these conjunctions and disjunctions, and it is just of *these* that an augmentation takes place* [when a multitude of persons is engaged in rendering Sound manifest].

d. Having thus removed the objections offered by others, he proceeds to state what will establish his own theory.†

नित्यस्तु स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥

Sound eternal, else it would not avail for communication.

Aph. 18.—But it must be eternal, because its exhibition is [available—which it else would not be—]for the sake of another.

यद्वा महान् शब्द इत्युपलभ्यते। तत्र परमते प्रतिपुरुषं शब्दावयवा उत्पन्नास्सन्तः तूले महत्त्ववच्छब्दे महत्त्वं सम्पादयन्तीति वक्तुमशक्यं। परमते शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन निरवयवत्वात्॥

* अतो ऽगत्या कर्णशष्कुलीमण्डलस्य सर्वतस्सरणिं व्याप्नुवद्भिः संयोगविभागैर्नैरन्तर्येणासक्तग्रहणान्महानिवावयवानिवच प्रतीयते। संयोगविभागा नादपदेन वाच्यास्तेषामेव वृद्धिरिति भावः॥

† एवं परप्रतिपादितदूषणान्युद्धृत्य स्वमते साधकं वक्तुं प्रक्रमते॥

a. 'Eternal'—i. e. *sound* must be eternal. Its 'exhibition'—i. e. its utterance—[here denoted by the term] *darśana* [from *dris* 'to see'] because Sound is perceived or becomes manifest thereby [i. e. by means of utterance]. 'Because for the sake of another'—i. e. because it is [available] to the end that another may understand one's meaning. If it were not eternal, then, as it would not continue till the hearer had understood our meaning [—the *perceived* sound ceasing on the instant that it reaches the ear—], the understanding [of what was uttered] would not take place because of the absence of the cause :—such is the import.* [The understanding of what is uttered must *follow*—at however short an interval—the perception of the sound uttered; and if the sound uttered perish on the hearing, then, being no longer in existence, it cannot be the *cause* of any thing. If, on the other hand, it continue to exist, for any period however short, after ceasing to be perceived,—it is impossible to assign any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discontinuance of its existence,—whence its eternity is inferred.]

b. Moreover† [as Sound is prospectively eternal, so was it antecedently—for] :—

सर्वत्र यौगपद्यात् ॥ १९ ॥

Sound is eternal, because hundreds simultaneously recognise a sound, which cannot therefore be a new production.

Aph. 19.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being everywhere simultaneousness [in the recognition of it by ever so many hearers].

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* नित्य इति शब्दो नित्यस्यात्। दृश्यते व्यज्यते शब्दो ऽनेनेति दर्शनमुच्चारणं। तस्य परार्थत्वात्। अन्यस्यार्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थत्वात्। अनित्यत्वे श्रोतुरर्थप्रतिपत्तिपर्यन्तन्न तिष्ठतीति प्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यात् कारणाभावादिति भावः॥

† किञ्च ॥

a. 'Every where:'—say in the word *go*, simply, [—a single example of a word here sufficing as the representative of any or every word—]. 'By there being simultaneousness'—i. e. because there arises simultaneously [in the minds of a hundred or more persons, on hearing the word *go*—"a cow"]—a correct recognition. That "This [letter G, of the word *go*,] is that same letter G [that I have heard on an indefinite number of former occasions,]" is the recognition, simultaneously, of many persons; and a multitude of persons do not simultaneously fall into an error [—this being as unlikely as it is that a hundred arrows discharged simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by *mistake* hit the same object—]; such is the import.*

b. When the word *go* "cow" has been pronounced ten times, one says "The word *go* has been pronounced ten times" but not "Ten words of the form *go* have been pronounced;" and he next declares that Sound is proved to be eternal by *this* fact also.†

संख्याभावात् ॥ २० ॥

Sound is eternal, because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated.

Aph. 20.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by the absence of Number.

a. 'Of Number:'—i. e. because Number [which belongs to that which, being transitory, is succeeded by another of the same kind,] does not belong to Sound [—for the word *go*, heard ten

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* सर्वत्र। गोशब्दमात्रे। यौगपद्यात्। अबाधितप्रतिज्ञाया युगपदुत्पत्तेः। स एवायं गकार इति युगपदनेकेषां प्रत्यभिज्ञा भवति नह्यनेके युगपद्भ्रान्ता भवन्तीति भावः॥

† दशकृत्वो गोशब्दस्योच्चारणे दशवारमुच्चरितो गोशब्द इत्येव वदति नतु दश गोशब्दा उच्चारिता इति। अतोऽपि शब्दो नित्य इत्याह॥

times over, is just the same word *go*,—as remarked under *Aph.* 19. *b.*] This is plain.*

b. And for the following reason too it is eternal, as he states :†—

अनपेक्षत्वात् ॥ २१ ॥

Sound is eternal because indiscerptible.

Aph. 21.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being no ground for anticipation [of its destruction].

a. That is to say, because we do not know any cause that should destroy Sound. To explain :—as, on the mere inspection of a web, for instance, one feels certain that—"This web was produced by the conjunction of threads, and it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of the threads,"—so, from our having no such certainty as to any cause that should lead to the destruction of *Sound*, we conclude that it is eternal‡ [—on the same principle that the immortality of the Soul has been argued from its indiscerptibility].

b. But then [—some one may say—] "Sound is a modification of the air, since [—as you admit under *Aph.* 17.—] it

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* संख्येति। शब्दे संख्याभावात्। स्पष्टम्॥

† इतोऽपि नित्य इत्याह॥

‡ शब्दनाशकारणस्याज्ञातत्वादित्यर्थः। यथा पटादिदर्शनमात्रेण पटोऽयन्तन्तुसंयोगजन्यस्तन्तुसंयोगनाशादिनंक्ष्यतीति निश्चिनोति तथा शब्दनाशकारणनिश्चयाभावान्नित्य इति भावः॥

arises from the conjunctions thereof [with the organ of hearing];—and so too the *Sikshá* [—that appendage to the Vedas which treats of pronunciation—] tells us 'Air arrives at the state of being Sound;'—and thus being a product of Air, it is *not* eternal." This doubt having presented itself, he declares* as follows:—

प्रख्याभावाच्च योग्यस्य ॥ २२ ॥

Sound not due to Air, because not tangible.

Aph. 22.—And]the case is not as the doubter under *Aph.* 21. *b.* suggests], because [if it were so] there would be no perception [by the organ of Hearing] of any object appropriate to it.

a. 'Appropriate to it;'—i. e. an object of the sensation that arises from the organ of Hearing—viz., Sound:—'because there would be no perception;'—i. e. by reason of our finding the absence of any perception;—because modifications of the *Air* are not what the organ of Hearing takes cognizance of,—Sound not being something *tangible* [as the Air is held by the Naiyáyikas to be, while Sound they admit has an altogether different substratum,—viz., the Ether—]; such is the import.†

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* ननु शब्दो वायुविकारः। तदीयसंयोगैरुत्पन्नत्वात्। तथाच शिक्षा वायुरापद्यते शब्दतामिति वायुजन्यत्वाद नित्य इत्याशङ्कायामाह ॥

† योग्यस्य। श्रोत्रेन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयस्य। शब्दस्य। प्रख्याभावात्। प्रत्यक्षाभावप्रसङ्गात्। वायुविकारस्य श्रोत्रेन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वात्। शब्दस्याप्यस्पृश्यत्वाच्चेति भावः ॥

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ २३ ॥

Sound is eternal, for this is implied in Scripture.

Aph. 23.—And [Sound is proved to be eternal] by our seeing a proof, [of this, in a text of the Scripture which will be cited in the commentary here following].

a. That is to say;—because we see a proof that language is eternal, in the following text—viz., "By language, that alters not, eternal,"* &c.

b. And the truth is, that, although this declaration [—viz. the text just quoted—] was intended for another purpose [than to prove the eternity of Sound], still it does declare, incidentally, the eternity of language, and therefore Sound [without which it is impossible that language should be eternal] is eternal.†

c. Here ends the topic of Sound.‡

SECTION III.

ON THE NATURE OF SENTENCES, &c.

d. Though thus Sound is eternal, as also the connection between Sound and sense, still, that an instigation in the shape

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* वाचा विरूपनित्ययेति मन्त्रे नित्यया वाचेति लिङ्गदर्शनादित्यर्थः ॥

† यद्यपीदमन्यपरं वाक्यं तथापि वाचो नित्यत्वमनुवदति तस्मान्नित्यशब्द इति भावः ॥

‡ शब्दाधिकरणं समाप्तम् ॥

of a sentence is no proof of any thing's being a duty, he states [on behalf of an opponent, and therefore] *ironically* as follows:*—

उत्पत्तौ वा रचनाः स्युरर्थस्यातन्निमित्तत्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

Objection that though Words may be eternally connected with their meanings, still this does not apply to Sentences†

Aph. 24.—This [—viz. the knowledge of the meanings of words—] being by nature, still let these [—viz. the connections between *sentences* and their meanings—] be factitious,—because the cause of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the whole sentence] is not this [knowledge of the meanings of separate words].

a. 'This being by nature:'—i. e., the fact that knowledge of the meanings of words is natural [and "in short *eternal*"—see *Aph.* 5. *d.*—] being granted;—still the connections between sentences and the meanings of the sentences are 'factitious,'—i. e. are devised by man; because of its being 'not *that*,— i. e. [because of its being] something *different* from the knowledge of the meanings of the words, that is the 'cause,' or producer, thereof,—viz. 'of the meaning,' i. e.—of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.†

b. For [—to explain—], the sense of a sentence is not barely

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* एवं शब्दस्य शब्दार्थसम्बन्धस्यच नित्यत्वेऽपि वाक्यात्मिका चोदना न धर्मे प्रमाणमित्याक्षिपति ॥

† उत्पत्ताविति। उत्पत्तौ। पदार्थज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सत्यां। वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोस्सम्बन्धाः रचनाः। पुरुषकल्पिताः। स्युः। अर्थस्य। वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य। अतत्। पदार्थज्ञानभिन्नं। निमित्तं। कारणं। यस्य। तत्त्वात्।

the [aggregate of the separate] senses of its words. There is [—we will admit—] a connection between a word and its sense [—a connection, as remarked under *Aph.* 5. *c.*, in the shape of *power*, or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning—]; but it is not the fact that the connection between a *collection* of words in the shape of a sentence, and the sense of that sentence, is in like manner that of *power* [—or of God's having pre-arranged that such and such groupes of words should convey such and such a sense]; but the connection is quite a different one, and it is devised by man, and is artificial: —how then can such be our evidence for [—or the cause of an absolutely correct knowledge of] Duty? Such is the import of the aphorism conveying the *primâ facie* view.*

c. He now declares the established view.†

तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायोऽर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

Analysis of a Sentence.

Aph. 25.—[In each injunction of Scripture there is seen] the mention, along with a verb, of those [words] that are in it, because it is this [viz., the knowledge of the sense of the words—] that is

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* नहि पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थः। पदस्य पदार्थेन सह सम्बन्धस्तथा पदसमूहरूपवाक्यस्य वाक्यार्थेन सह न शक्तिसम्बन्धः किन्त्वन्य एव। स च पुरुषकल्पितः कृत्रिमः कथं धर्मे प्रमाणमिति पूर्वपक्षसूत्राभिप्रायः॥

† सिद्धान्तमाह॥

the producer of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the sentence].

a. 'Of those that are in it';—i. e. of those several words that are extant in these [sentences]; 'along with what signifies action',—i. e., along with a term that expresses power [—in other words, along with a verb—]; 'the mention', i. e. the reading [or the employment] is observed, in [the texts which enjoin] the *Agnihotra* sacrifice, &c. Hence the knowledge of the sense of a sentence—[knowledge] which we had not before [hearing or reading it]—comes only from a collection of words which involves *a verb*:—'because it is *this* that is the producer',—i. e. because of the fact that 'this'—viz. the knowledge of the meaning of the words, is the producer', or cause, thereof.*

b. To explain:—In the injunction "He that desireth Paradise should celebrate the *Agnihotra* sacrifice" [see *Aph.* 5. *j.*], the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence—viz., that it is by the sacrifice called the *Agnihotra* that one may secure Paradise,—does not take place unless there be present the meaning of the words [—viz., the words *Agnihotra* and *Paradise*—]; but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence just consists in the knowledge of the mutual relation, *consistently*, of the meanings

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* तद्भूतानां। तेषु क्लृप्तानां प्रत्येकपदानां। क्रियार्थेन। शक्तिवाचिना पदेन सह। समाम्नायः। पठनं। दृश्यते। अग्निहोत्राद्यर्थेषु। अतः क्रियावाचकपदघटितपदसमूहादेवापूर्वो वाक्यार्थग्रहः। अर्थस्य। वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य। तन्निमित्तत्वात्। तत्। पदार्थज्ञानं। निमित्तं। कारणं यस्य। तत्त्वात्॥

that arise before us from the *words*:*—[so that if it be agreed that the meaning of the separate *words* is not dependent on man's contrivance, so neither is that of sentences formed out of such words;—and such additional difficulties as may seem to grow out of this view will be grappled with in the sequel].

लोके सन्निधमात्प्रयोगसन्निकर्षः स्यात् ॥ २६ ॥

As in secular matters, so in Scripture, the formation of sentences not capricious.

Aph. 26.—Since, in [the secular language of] the world, there is a regular order,—[so in the Veda also] let there take place the employment [of language according to a fixed system to be learned through traditional instruction].

a. 'In the world';—i. e. in secular speech;—having discerned what is meant by the word,—or, with a previous knowledge of what is meant by the word—, 'since there is a regular order' i. e. since there is an employment [of words according to a fixed system,—men not devising phrases capriciously—so] in the *Veda* also, let there be—founded on knowledge derived from the traditional instruction of teachers,—the 'occurrence'—i. e. the taking place—of an employment of language [according to a fixed system].†

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* अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र अग्निहोत्रनामकहोमेन स्वर्गभावयेदिति वाक्यार्थज्ञानं न पदार्थोपस्थितिमन्तरा भवति किन्तु पदादुपस्थितानामर्थानां योग्यतया परस्परसम्बन्धज्ञानमेव वाक्यार्थज्ञानमिति भावः।

† लोके। लौकिकशब्दे। पदार्थं दृष्ट्वा पदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकं।

Again he [the author] ironically states that this [the Veda] is no authority in regard to duty, because [forsooth] it is not eternal, and it has been made by men, and men are liable to err.*

वेदांश्चैके सन्निकर्षं पुरुषाख्याः ॥ २७ ॥

Objection to the eternity of the Vedas that they contain the names of men.

Aph. 27.—And the Vedas some declare to be something recent, [because] there are the names of men [in it].

a. 'The Veda,' &c. :—i. e. since there are the names *Káṭhaka,* and *Kauma,* &c., therefore it is 'recent'—a matter of *now*—that is to say *having had a beginning.* 'The Veda'—i. e. the scriptures. 'Some'—i. e. the followers of the Nyáya. These [followers of the Nyáya] have asserted this,—such is the remainder† [which requires to be supplied in order to complete the Aphorism].

सन्नियमात्। प्रयोगात्। वेदेऽपि गुरुपरम्परया ज्ञानपूर्वकः। प्रयोगस्य सन्निकर्षः। उत्पत्तिः। स्यात्॥

* वेदस्यानित्यत्वात् पौरुषेयत्वात् धर्मे न प्रमाणं पुरुषदोषसम्भवादिति पुनराक्षिपति॥

† वेदानिति। यतः पुरुषाख्याः। काठकं कौथमिति नामानि। अतः सन्निकर्षं। आधुनिकं। सादीनित्यर्थः। वेदान्। आम्नायान्। एके। नैयायिकाः। आहुरिति शेषः॥

b. And for the following reason also [—if we are to listen to such objectors as the Naiyáyikas—] it [the Veda] is un-eternal —as the author [ironically] states.*

अनित्यदर्शनाच्च ॥ २८ ॥

Objection to the eternity of the Vedas that they make mention of persons who must antecedently have been born.

Aph. 28.—Because of our seeing un-eternal persons [mentioned in the Vedas].

a. 'Un-eternal,' &c. Because, in such scriptures as "Babara, the son of Prahaṇi, desired,"—"Kusurubinda, the son of Uddálaki, desired,"—we see mention of 'un-eternal persons,' i. e. of persons to whom belonged birth and death; and these sentences did not exist before the birth of these persons; so that the un-eternity and the human origin [of the Veda] is established by the fact that it *had* a beginning.†

a. The author now mentions the established tenet in regard to this.‡

उक्तन्तु शब्दपूर्वत्वम् ॥ २९ ॥

The eternity of the Veda re-asserted.

Aph. 29.—But there has been declared [already] the priority of Sound [to any point in time].

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* दूषोऽप्यनित्य इत्याह ॥

† अनित्येति। अनित्यानां। जननमरणवतां। बबरः प्राहणिरकामयत कुसुरुबिन्द औद्दालकिरकामयत इत्यादिवेदेषु दर्शनात्। तेषाञ्जननात्प्रागिमानि वाक्यानि नासन्निति सादित्वादनित्यत्वं पौरुषेयत्वञ्च सिद्धम्॥

‡ सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

a. 'But there has been declared,' &c. To supply the ellipsis,—the priority [to any point in time], i. e. the eternity, of Sound has been established. The eternity of Sound being established, the eternity of the Veda also is declared in the aphorism:—such is the meaning.*

आख्या प्रवचनात् ॥ ३० ॥

How sections of the Vedas come to be named after mortals.

Aph. 30.—The name [—derived from that of some mortal—was given, to this or that section of the Veda,] because of his reading it.

a. 'The name,'—i. e. the name of "the *Káṭhaka* section," [see *Aph.* 27. *a.*], or the like, is suitable 'because of his reading' or studying it,—the '*Káṭhaka* section' being that which was perused by KAṬHA.†

परन्तु श्रुतिसामान्यम् ॥ ३१ ॥

What seem to be names of men, in the Veda, not really such.

Aph. 31.—But the terms in the text [which seem to be names of men] are common [to other objects, and do not there designate men].

Although there is the name "Babara" or "Právahaṇi" [in the Veda,—see *Aph.* 28. *a.*], yet the text—the word 'Právahaṇi' or the like—is '*common*'—, i. e. is expressive also of some other

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* उक्तमिति । शब्दे पूर्वत्वं नित्यत्वं साधितं प्रागिति शेषः । शब्दे नित्यत्वे सिद्धे वेदेऽपि नित्यत्वं स्चत्रे उक्तमित्यर्थः ॥

† आख्या । काठकादिसमाख्या । प्रवचनात् । अध्ययनात् । कठेनाधीतं काठकमित्युपपन्ना ॥

thing [than it may appear at first sight to denote]. For example—[in the word *Právahaṇi*—] the prefix *pra* implies 'excess,'—the word *vah* signifies 'motion,'—the final *i* represents the agent; and thus the word signifies the *Wind* which *moves very fast*; and *this* is without beginning; and [moreover] the word "Babara" is a word imitative of the sound of the Wind,—so that there is not even a *smell* of inconsistency.*

Objection that the Vedas contain passages of sheer nonsense.

b. But then how can it be instrumental in producing right knowledge in regard to Duty, when the Veda contains such incoherent prattle as the following—; viz. "Jaradgava, in cloth slippers, standing at the door, is singing benedictions:—of him, a Bráhman-woman, desirous of a son, enquires,—'O Sir!—what is the meaning of this [which I hear you declaring] about intercourse on days of fasting† ?"—or the following;—viz. "The cows also attend this sacrifice"—? To this he replies as follows‡:—

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* यद्यपि बबरः प्रावहणिरित्यस्ति परन्तु श्रुतिः प्रावहणादिशब्दः सामान्यं। अन्यार्थस्यापि वाचकं। तथाहि। प्रेत्यस्य उत्कार्षाश्रयः। वहनशब्दस्य गतिः। इकारः कर्त्ता। तथाचोत्कृष्टगत्याश्रयः। वायुपरस्त्वचानादिः। बबर इति वायुशब्दानुकरणमिति नानुपपत्तिगन्धोऽपि॥

† Or, according to another reading, "What *is* the meaning of garlic as regards the goddess *Umá*?"

‡ ननु जरद्गवः कम्बलपादुकाभ्यां द्वारि स्थितो गायति मङ्गलानि तं ब्राह्मणी पृच्छति पुत्रकामा राजन्नमायां लभनस्य कोऽर्थ इति गावो वा एतत्सत्रमासतेत्यादीनामसम्बद्धप्रलापानां वेदे सत्त्वात् कथं स धर्मे प्रमाणमित्यत्राह॥

क्रतेवा विनियोगः स्यात् कर्म्मणस्सम्बन्धात् ॥ ३.२ ॥

Passages at first sight unmeaning, may be found, on examination, to have a meaning.

Aph. 32.—It [—the expression just charged with being incoherent—] *may* have an application to the action, through its really standing in relation to the action [which it serves suggestively to inculcate as a duty].

a. 'To the action,' &c. :—that is to say :—even such an expression as "The cows also attend this sacrifice" [*Aph.* 31. *b.*],—'through its standing in relation'—i. e. through its really involving a mutual reference to—'the action'—i. e. the passage enjoining some action,—has 'an application'—viz. through the praise* [which it suggests as attending the performance of the action].

b. The import of the argument is this, viz.—Did the very brutes—the cows—engage in the sacrifice, or ought wise *men* to engage in its performance?—the hinting of the *doubt* serves to commend† [that duty which even things senseless would engage in if men neglected it;—as we say, "The very stones would cry out" if men were to keep silence when under an imperative obligation to speak out].

c. So much for the first section of the first Book of the commentary on the Aphorisms of Jaimini.‡

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* क्रत इति। कर्म्मणः कर्म्मप्रतिपादकवाक्यस्य। सम्बन्धात्। परस्पराकाङ्क्षाघटितत्वात्। गावो वा इत्यादीनामपि। क्रते। कर्म्मणि। स्तुतिद्वारा विनियोगः॥

† अयमाशयः। गवादयो जडा अपि कर्म्मानुष्ठानं चक्रुः किमुत विद्वांसो ऽनुतिष्ठेरन्नित्यत्र संशय इति स्तुतौ तात्पर्यबद्धमिति॥

‡ इति जैमिनिसूत्रवृत्तौ प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः॥

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Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 13 February, 2016